Social Networks with Competing Products[*]

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Abstract

We introduce a new threshold model of social networks, in which the nodes influenced by their neighbours can adopt one out of several alternatives. We characterize social networks for which adoption of a product by the whole network is possible (respectively necessary) and the ones for which a unique outcome is guaranteed. These characterizations directly yield polynomial time algorithms that allow us to determine whether a given social network satisfies one of the above properties.

We also study algorithmic questions for networks without unique outcomes. We show that the problem of determining whether a final network exists in which all nodes adopted some product is NP-complete. In turn, we also resolve the complexity of the problems of determining whether a given node adopts some (respectively, a given) product in some (respectively, all) network(s).

Further, we show that the problem of computing the minimum possible spread of a product is NP-hard to approximate with an approximation ratio better than $\Omega(n)$, in contrast to the maximum spread, which is efficiently computable. Finally, we clarify that some of the above problems can be solved in polynomial time when there are only two products.

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

Social networks have become a huge interdisciplinary research area with important links to sociology, economics, epidemiology, computer science, and mathematics. A flurry of numerous articles, notably the influential [21], and recent books, see

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[*]A preliminary version of this paper appeared as [2].

[7, 13, 28, 17, 10] shows the growing relevance of this field. It deals with such diverse topics as epidemics, spread of certain patterns of social behaviour, effects of advertising, and emergence of 'bubbles' in financial markets.

A large part of research on social networks focusses on the problem of *diffusion*, that is the spread of a certain event or information over the network, for example becoming infected or adopting a given product. In the remainder of the paper, we will use as a running example the adoption of a product, which is being marketed over a social network.

Two prevalent models have been considered for capturing diffusion: the *threshold models* introduced in [15] and [23] and the *independent cascade models* studied in [11]. In the threshold models, each node i has a threshold $\theta(i) \in (0,1]$ and it decides to adopt a product when the total weight of incoming edges from nodes that have already adopted a product exceeds the threshold. In a special case a node decides to adopt a new product if at least the fraction $\theta(i)$ of its neighbours has done so. In some cases the threshold may also depend on the specific product under consideration. In the cascade models, each node that adopts a product can activate each of his neighbours with a certain probability and each node has only one chance of activating a neighbour[1].

Most of research has focussed on the situation in which the players face the choice of adopting a specific product or not. The algorithmic problem of choosing an initial set of nodes so as to maximize the adoption of a given product were studied initially in [9] and [18]. Certain variants and generalizations of this problem were also studied in several publications that followed, e.g., [8, 12, 22].

When studying social networks from the point of view of adopting new products it is natural to lift the restriction of one product. One natural example of such a situation is when users can adopt one out of several competing products (for example providers of mobile telephones). Then, because of lower subscription costs, each owner of a mobile telephone naturally prefers that his friends choose the same provider. Another example is when children have to choose a secondary school. Here, again, children prefer to choose a school which their friends will choose, as well. Also, in discussions preceding voting in a small institution, for instance for the position of a chairman of a club, preferences announced by some club members may influence the votes cast by their friends.

What is common in these situations is that the number of choices is small in comparison with the number of agents and the outcome of the adoption process does not need to be unique. Indeed, individuals with a low 'threshold' can adopt

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[1] For the case of a single product, and when thresholds are assumed to be random variables, the two models have been proved to be equivalent in the sense that they produce the same distribution on outcomes [18].

any product a small group of their friends adopts. As a result this model leads to different considerations than the ones mentioned above.

Social networks in the presence of multiple products have been studied in a number of recent papers. In the presence of multiple products, diffusion has been investigated recently for the cascade model in [4, 6, 19]. In [19] a special case of the cascade model is studied and NP-hardness results are obtained on finding the best set of influential nodes in the presence of another competing product. In [4] the authors also study a generalization to a cascade model with multiple products and provide approximation algorithms for the problem of maximizing the influence of a product given the initial adopters of the other products. Finally, in [6], the authors provide approximation algorithms for certain variants of the problem with two products.

For threshold models, an extension to two products has been recently proposed in [5], where the authors examine whether the algorithmic approach of [18] can be extended. Algorithms and hardness of approximation results are provided for certain variants of the diffusion process. In line with [18], the authors of [5] also assume that the threshold of each node is a random variable and the goal is to maximize the expected spread.

Game theoretic aspects have also been considered in the case of two or more products. In particular, the behavior of best response dynamics in infinite graphs is studied in [21], when each node has to choose between two different products. An extension of this model is studied in [16] with a focus on notions of compatibility and bilinguality, i.e., having the option to adopt both products at an extra cost so as to be compatible with all your neighbours. Other game theoretic approaches have also been recently considered, by viewing the firms that market their products as strategic agents, see [1, 14, 27].

1.2   Contributions

We study a new model of a social network in which nodes (agents) can choose out of *several* alternatives *and* in which various outcomes of the adoption process are possible. Our model combines a number of features present in various models of networks and is a natural next step in this line of research.

It is a threshold model and we assume that the threshold of a node is a fixed number as in [8] (and unlike [18, 5], where they are random variables). This is in contrast to Hebb's model of learning in networks of neurons, the focus of which is on learning, leading to strengthening of the connections (here thresholds). In our context, the threshold should be viewed as a fixed 'resistance level' of a node to adopt a product. Contrary to the SIR model, see, e.g., [17], in which a node can be in only two states, in our model each node can choose out of several states

(products). We also allow that not all nodes have exactly the same set of products to choose from, e.g. due to geographic or income restrictions some products may be available only to a subset of the nodes. If a node changes its state from the initial one, the new state (that corresponds to the adopted product) is final, as is the case with most of the related literature.

Our work consists of two parts. In the first part (Sections 3, 4, 5) we study three basic problems concerning this model, motivated by the nondeterministic character of the adoption process. In particular, we find necessary and sufficient conditions for determining whether

- a specific product will possibly be adopted by all nodes,

- a specific product will necessarily be adopted by all nodes,

- the adoption process of the products will yield a unique outcome.

For each of these questions, we obtain a characterization with respect to properties of the underlying graph. Furthermore, our characterizations yield efficient algorithms for solving each problem. We also identify a natural class of social networks that yield a unique outcome.

In the second part (Section 6) we investigate the complexity of various other algorithmic problems concerning the adoption process. We start with the problem of determining whether, given an initial network, a final network exists in which all nodes adopted a product. Then we move on to questions regarding the behaviour of a given node in terms of adopting a given product or some product in some (respectively, all) network(s). We also study the problems of computing the minimum (respectively, maximum) possible spread of a product.

We resolve the complexity of all these problems. Some of them turn out to be efficiently solvable, whereas the remaining ones are either co-NP-complete or have strong inapproximability properties. We also show that some, but not all, of these problems can be solved in polynomial time when there are only two products.

Finally, in Section 7 we explain how one can transform social networks into ones that are in some sense simpler, at the cost of addition of new nodes. These transformations clarify the conciseness hidden in the initial definition and relate it to the one used in [2], in which the threshold functions were product independent.

2 Preliminaries

Assume a fixed weighted directed graph $G = (V, E, w)$ (with no parallel edges and no self-loops), with $n = |V|$ and $w_{ij} \in [0, 1]$ being the weight of edge (i, j). In

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our proposed algorithms we shall assume that we are given the adjacency matrix representation of the graph. Some of our algorithms use the adjacency lists representation, which can be easily obtained from the adjacency matrix in time $O(n^2)$.

Given a node i of G we denote by $N(i)$ the set of nodes from which there is an incoming edge to i. We call each $j \in N(i)$ a **neighbour** of i in G. We assume that for each node i such that $N(i) \neq \emptyset$, $\sum_{j \in N(i)} w_{ji} \leq 1$.

Let P be a finite set of alternatives, that we call from now on **products**. By a **social network** (from now on, just **network**) we mean a tuple (G, P, p, θ), where p assigns to each agent i a non-empty set of products $p(i) \subseteq P$ from which it can make a choice. For $i \in V$ and $t \in p(i)$ the **threshold function** θ yields a value $\theta(i, t) \in (0, 1]$. The threshold $\theta(i, t)$ should be viewed as agent i's resistance level to adopt product t. In some cases, the threshold function may not depend on the product t. We will call such functions **product independent** and we will then use $\theta(i)$ instead of $\theta(i, t)$ to denote the resistance of agent i.

The idea is that each node i is offered a non-empty set $p(i)$ of products from which it can make its choice. If $p(i)$ is a singleton, say $p(i) = \{t\}$, the node adopted the product t. Otherwise it can adopt a product t if the total weight of incoming edges from neighbours that have already adopted t is at least equal to the threshold $\theta(i, t)$. To formalize the problems that we want to study, we need first to introduce a number of notions. Since G, P and θ are fixed, we often identify each network with the function p.

Consider a binary relation $\rightarrow$ on networks. Denote by $\rightarrow^*$ the reflexive, transitive closure of $\rightarrow$. We call a reduction sequence $p \rightarrow^* p'$ **maximal** if for no p'' we have $p' \rightarrow p''$. In that case we will say that p' is a **final** network, given the initial network p.

Definition 2.1 Assume an initial network p and a network p'. We say that

- p' is **reachable** (from p) if $p \rightarrow^* p'$,

- p' is **unavoidable** (from p) if for all maximal sequences of reductions $p \rightarrow^* p''$ we have $p' = p''$,

- p admits a **unique outcome** if some network is unavoidable from p. □

So a network is reachable if it can be reached by some sequence of $\rightarrow$ reductions that starts with p, and it is unavoidable if it is reachable by a maximal sequence of reductions and a unique outcome of the initial network p exists.

From now on we specialize the relation $\rightarrow$. Given a social network p when

$N(i) \neq \emptyset$ we use the abbreviation $A(t,i)$ (to stand for "adoption condition for product t by node i") for the condition

$$\sum_{j \in N(i) \mid p(j)=\{t\}} w_{ji} \geq \theta(i,t)$$

and stipulate without loss of generality that $A(t,i)$ holds when $N(i) = \emptyset$.

Definition 2.2

- We write $p_1 \to p_2$ if $p_2 \neq p_1$ and for all nodes i, if $p_2(i) \neq p_1(i)$, then $|p_1(i)| \geq 2$ and for some $t \in p_1(i)$

$$p_2(i) = \{t\} \text{ and } A(t,i) \text{ holds in } p_1.$$

- We say that node i in a network p

  – **adopted product** t if $p(i) = \{t\}$,
  – **can adopt product** t if

$$t \in p(i) \wedge |p(i)| \geq 2 \wedge A(t,i).$$

$\square$

In particular, a node with no neighbours and more than one available product can adopt any product that is a possible choice for it. As with most of the literature on diffusion models, we also assume that an adoption decision is final. Once a node decides to adopt a product, it cannot cancel its decision or switch later to another product. In a follow up paper, [24], a game-theoretic framework is considered in which the agents' decisions are not final in the sense that they can switch to a more attractive product than the current one.

So $p_1 \to p_2$ holds if

- any node that adopted a product in p_2 either adopted it in p_1 or could adopt it in p_1,

- at least one node could adopt a product in p_1 and adopted it in p_2,

- the nodes that did not adopt a product in p_2 did not change their product sets.

Note that each modification of the function p results in assigning to a node i a singleton set. So if $p_1 \to^* p_2$, then for all nodes i either $p_2(i) = p_1(i)$ or $p_2(i)$ is a singleton set.

One can naturally incorporate in the reduction process an elimination of products that cannot be adopted. More precisely, given a network p and a node i, suppose that for some product $t \in p(i)$

$$\sum_{j \in N(i) | t \in p(j)} w_{ji} < \theta(i,t).$$

Then t can never be adopted by node i. Call such a product t **infeasible** for i. Clearly, at each state of the reduction process all infeasible products can be discarded from the corresponding product sets $p(i)$ without affecting the adoption process (and hence without affecting our results). We therefore allow only adoption steps in our model and no elimination steps.

One of the questions we are interested in is whether a product t can spread to the whole network. We will denote this final network by $[t]$, where $[t]$ denotes the constant function p such that $p(i) = \{t\}$ for all nodes i.

Below, given a network (G, P, p, θ) and a product $t \in P$ we denote by $G_{p,t}$ the weighted directed graph obtained from G by removing from it all edges to nodes i with $p(i) = \{t\}$. So in $G_{p,t}$ for all such nodes i we have $N(i) = \emptyset$ and for all other nodes the set of neighbours in $G_{p,t}$ and G is the same.

If each weight w_{ji} in the considered graph equals $\frac{1}{|N(i)|}$, then we call the corresponding network **equitable**. So in equitable networks the adoption condition $A(t,i)$ holds if at least the fraction $\theta(i,t)$ of the neighbours of i adopted in p product t.

Example 2.3 As an example consider the equitable networks in Figure 1, where $P = \{t_1, t_2\}$ and where we mention next to each node the set of products available to it. We assume in this example that the threshold function does not depend on the product argument, hence we omit it.


Figure 1: Two examples of social networks

In the first network, if $\theta(a) \leq \frac{1}{2}$, then the network in which each node apart from the one on the top left adopts product t_2 is reachable, though not unavoidable.

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It is no longer a reachable network if $\theta(a) > \frac{1}{2}$. In that case the initial network admits a unique outcome. In this unique outcome, node b adopts product t_2 if and only if $\theta(b) \leq \frac{1}{2}$.

For the second network the following more elaborate case distinction lists the possible values of p in the final reachable networks.

$$\theta(a) \leq \tfrac{1}{3} \wedge \theta(b) \leq \tfrac{1}{2} \qquad : (p(a) = \{t_1\} \vee p(a) = \{t_2\}) \wedge$$
$$\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad (p(b) = \{t_1\} \vee p(b) = \{t_2\})$$

$$\theta(a) \leq \tfrac{1}{3} \wedge \theta(b) > \tfrac{1}{2} \qquad : (p(a) = \{t_1\} \wedge p(b) = P) \vee$$
$$\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad (p(a) = p(b) = \{t_2\})$$

$$\tfrac{1}{3} < \theta(a) \leq \tfrac{2}{3} \wedge \theta(b) \leq \tfrac{1}{2} \quad : p(a) = p(b) = \{t_2\}$$

$$\tfrac{1}{3} < \theta(a) \wedge \theta(b) > \tfrac{1}{2} \qquad : p(a) = p(b) = P$$

$$\tfrac{2}{3} < \theta(a) \wedge \theta(b) \leq \tfrac{1}{2} \qquad : p(a) = P \wedge p(b) = \{t_2\}$$

In particular, when $\frac{1}{3} < \theta(a) \leq \frac{2}{3}$ and $\theta(b) \leq \frac{1}{2}$ there is a unique reduction sequence in which first node b adopts product t_2 *followed* by node a adopting t_2. $\square$

3 Reachable outcomes

We start with providing necessary and sufficient conditions for a product to be adopted by all nodes. We shall need the following notion.

Definition 3.1 Given a weighted directed graph G, a threshold function θ and a product t, we will say that G is (θ,t)-*well-structured* if for some function `level` that maps nodes to natural numbers, we have that for all nodes i such that $N(i) \neq \emptyset$

$$\sum_{j \in N(i)\,|\,\mathtt{level}(j) < \mathtt{level}(i)} w_{ji} \geq \theta(i,t). \tag{1}$$

In other words, a weighted directed graph is (θ,t)-well-structured if levels can be assigned to its nodes in such a way that for each node i such that $N(i) \neq \emptyset$, the sum of the weights of the incoming edges from lower levels is at least $\theta(i,t)$. We will often refer to the function `level` as a *certificate* for the graph being (θ,t)-well-structured. Note that there can be many certificates for a given graph. Note also that (θ,t)-well structured graphs can have cycles. For instance, it is easy to check that for every product $t \in P$ the second network in Figure 1 is (θ,t)-well structured when $\theta(i) \leq \frac{1}{3}$ for every node i.

We provide now a structural characterization of graphs that allow products to spread to the whole graph, given the threshold function θ. This will allow us to efficiently determine whether a given product can spread to the whole network.

Theorem 3.2 *Assume a network (G, P, p, θ) and a product $top \in P$. The network $(G, P, [top], \theta)$ is reachable from (G, P, p, θ) iff*

- *for all i, $top \in p(i)$,*

- *$G_{p,top}$ is (θ, top)-well-structured.*

Proof.
$(\Rightarrow)$ If for some node i we have $top \notin p(i)$, then i cannot adopt product top and $[top]$ is not reachable.

To establish the second condition consider a reduction sequence

$$p_1 \to p_2 \to \ldots \to p_m$$

starting in p and such that $p_m = [top]$.

Assign now to each node i the minimal k such that $p_{k+1}(i) = \{top\}$. We claim that this definition of the `level` function shows that $G_{p,top}$ is (θ, top)-well-structured. To see this, consider a node i.

Case 1. `level`$(i) = 0$.

Then $p(i) = \{top\}$, and we have $N(i) = \emptyset$ in $G_{p,top}$. Hence we do not need to argue about node i, since we only need to ensure (1) for nodes with $N(i) \neq \emptyset$.

Case 2. `level`$(i) > 0$.

Suppose that $N(i) \neq \emptyset$ and that `level`$(i) = k$. By the definition of the reduction the adoption condition $A(top, i)$ holds in p_k, i.e.,

$$\sum_{j \in N(i) \mid p_k(j) = \{top\}} w_{ji} \geq \theta(i, top).$$

But for each $j \in N(i)$ such that $p_k(j) = \{top\}$ we have by definition `level`$(j) <$ `level`(i). So (1) holds.

$(\Leftarrow)$ Consider a certificate function `level` showing that $G_{p,top}$ is (θ, top)-well-structured. Without loss of generality we can assume that the nodes in $G_{p,top}$ such that $N(i) = \emptyset$ are exactly the nodes of level 0. We construct by induction on the level m a reduction sequence $p \to^* p''$, such that for all nodes i we have $top \in p''(i)$ and for all nodes i of level $\leq m$ we have $p''(i) = \{top\}$.

Consider level 0. By definition of $G_{p,top}$, a node i is of level 0 iff it has no neighbours in G or $p(i) = \{top\}$. In the former case, by the first condition, $top \in p(i)$. So $p \to^* p''$, where the function p'' is defined by

$$p''(i) := \begin{cases} \{top\} & \text{if } \texttt{level}(i) = 0 \\ p(i) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

This establishes the induction basis. Suppose now that the claim holds for some level m, yielding the reduction sequence $p \to^* p'$. Consider the nodes of level $m + 1$. For each such node i we have $top \in p'(i)$, $N(i) \neq \emptyset$ and

$$\sum_{j \in N(i) | \mathtt{level}(j) < \mathtt{level}(i)} w_{ji} \geq \theta(i, top).$$

By the definition of $G_{p,top}$ the sets of neighbours of i in G and $G_{p,top}$ are the same. By the induction hypothesis for all nodes j such that $\mathtt{level}(j) < \mathtt{level}(i)$ we have $p'(j) = \{top\}$. Hence, either such a node i adopted product top in p' or can adopt product top in p'.

Thus, $p' \to^* p''$, where the function p'' is defined by

$$p''(i) := \begin{cases} \{top\} & \text{if } \mathtt{level}(i) = m + 1 \\ p'(i) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Consequently $p \to^* p''$, which establishes the induction step. By induction we conclude $p \to^* [top]$. $\qquad\qquad\square$

Next we show that testing if a graph is (θ, t)-well-structured can be efficiently solved.

Theorem 3.3 *Given a weighted directed graph G, a threshold function θ and a product t, we can decide whether G is (θ, t)-well-structured in time $O(n^2)$.*

Proof. We claim that the following simple algorithm achieves this:

- Given a weighted directed graph G, first assign level 0 to all nodes with $N(i) = \emptyset$. If no such node exists, output that the graph is not (θ, t)-well-structured.

- Inductively, at step i, assign level i to each node for which condition (1) from Definition 3.1 is satisfied when considering only its neighbours that have been assigned levels $0, \ldots, i - 1$.

- If by iterating this all nodes are assigned a level, then output that the graph is (θ, t)-well-structured. Otherwise, output that G is not (θ, t)-well-structured.

The above algorithm can be implemented in time $O(n^2 + |E|) = O(n^2)$. We can first create the adjacency list representation so that for each node we have a list with its outgoing edges. Given this representation, we can implement the steps of the algorithm in $O(|E|)$ time. The idea is that each edge of the graph is processed only once and only a constant number of operations is needed for every

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edge. Indeed, one can keep a counter for every node that sums up the weight from nodes that have already been assigned a level. For every node that was assigned a level at the previous round, one can go through its outgoing edges and update the corresponding counters accordingly (only counters of nodes that have not yet been assigned a level are updated). Hence we can assign a level number to any node whose counter has been updated at the current round and has exceeded the threshold.

To prove the correctness of the algorithm, note that if the input graph is not (θ, t)-well-structured, then the algorithm will output No, as otherwise, at termination it would have constructed a `level` function for a non-(θ, t)-well-structured graph. Hence it remains to prove that if a graph is (θ, t)-well-structured, the algorithm will output Yes.

Suppose a graph G is (θ, t)-well-structured. We will use a certificate function, l_G, in which all nodes are assigned the minimum possible level. For each node i, let l^i be a certificate function where node i has the minimum possible level. Then define $l_G(i) := \min_j l^j(i) = l^i(i)$.

First note that l_G is a certificate function because a minimum of certificate functions is also a certificate for G. By the definition of l_G, the level of each node i cannot be lowered below $l_G(i)$, i.e., for all nodes i

$$l_G(i) = \min\{k : \sum_{j \in N(i) | l_G(j) < k} w_{ji} \geq \theta(i, t)\}. \tag{2}$$

We now prove that every node is assigned a level by the algorithm and in particular that l_G is the function `level` generated by the algorithm, hence the algorithm outputs Yes. For level 0, note that by the minimality of l_G and since $\theta(i, t) > 0$ for every i, the only nodes for which l_G assigns 0 are all nodes i such that $N(i) = \emptyset$. But these are precisely the nodes that are assigned level 0 by the algorithm as well.

Suppose by induction that l_G and `level` coincide on all nodes considered by the algorithm in steps $1, \ldots, k - 1$, where k is a level used by l_G. Then by the construction of the algorithm and by (2), the algorithm assigns level k to *all* nodes i such that $l_G(i) = k$. Moreover, since k is used by l_G, some new nodes are assigned a level at step k.

Hence, l_G and `level` coincide. Consequently the algorithm assigns a level to all nodes and hence outputs Yes. □

Note 3.4 *The above algorithm can run in time $O(|E|)$ when we are given directly the representation of the graph in terms of adjacency lists of outgoing edges for each node instead of the adjacency matrix.*

Finally, we end this section by observing that the algorithmic question of determining whether a network $[top]$ is reachable can be solved efficiently.

Theorem 3.5 *Assume a network* (G, P, p, θ) *and a product* $top \in P$. *There is an algorithm running in time* $O(n^2)$ *that determines whether the network* $(G, P, [top], \theta)$ *is reachable.*

Proof. The proof follows either by using Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.3 for $G_{p,top}$ or by simply start performing adoptions only of product top until no further reduction is possible. $\qquad\square$

4   Unavoidable outcomes

Next, we focus on the notion of unavoidable outcomes. We establish the following characterization.

Theorem 4.1 *Assume a network* (G, P, p, θ) *and a product* $top \in P$. *A network* $(G, P, [top], \theta)$ *is unavoidable iff*

- *for all* i, *if* $N(i) = \emptyset$, *then* $p(i) = \{top\}$,

- *for all* i, $top \in p(i)$,

- $G_{p,top}$ *is* (θ, top)-*well-structured.*

To prove this, we shall need first a few lemmas.

Lemma 4.2 *Suppose that* $p \rightarrow^* p'$ *and for some node* i *we have* $p'(i) = \{t\}$. *Then for some node* j *such that* $N(j) = \emptyset$ *or* $p(j)$ *is a singleton, we have* $t \in p(j)$.

Intuitively, this means that for each product eventually adopted by some node, the diffusion of the product must have started by some node j (possibly different) such that either j had already adopted it or the product was a possible choice for j in the beginning of the sequence and j has no neighbors.

Proof. Let $p \rightarrow^* p'$ be of the form

$$p_1 \rightarrow p_2 \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow p_m.$$

Let l' be the smallest index l such that for some node j we have $p_l(j) = \{t\}$. If $l' = 1$, then $p(j) = \{t\}$ and we are done. If $l' > 1$ then by the choice of l' we have $N(j) = \emptyset$, as otherwise for some node k we would have $p_{l'-1}(k) = \{t\}$ (recall that $\theta(i,t) \neq 0$ for all i,t and that for nodes that have a non-empty neighborhood, the only way to adopt a product is through their neighbors). Moreover, $t \in p_{l'-1}(j)$ implies $t \in p_1(j)$, that is $t \in p(j)$. $\qquad\square$

Lemma 4.3 *Assume a network* (G, P, p, θ) *and a product* $top \in P$. *Suppose that*

- *for all* i, *if* $N(i) = \emptyset$ *or* $p(i)$ *is a singleton, then* $p(i) = \{top\}$.

Then (G, P, p, θ) *admits a unique outcome.*

Intuitively, this means that if initially only one product can be adopted, then a unique outcome of the network exists.

Proof. Consider two maximal sequences of reductions $p \to^* p'$ and $p \to^* p''$. Let $p \to^* p'$ be of the form

$$p_1 \to p_2 \to \ldots \to p_m.$$

We prove by induction on k that for all nodes i and products t if $p_k(i) = \{t\}$, then $p''(i) = \{t\}$. If $p(i) = \{t\}$, then also $p''(i) = \{t\}$. This takes care of the induction basis.

Assume the claim holds for some k and suppose $p_{k+1}(i) = \{t\}$. If $p_k(i) = \{t\}$, then by the induction hypothesis $p''(i) = \{t\}$. Otherwise by the definition of the $\to$ relation $t \in p_k(i)$, $N(i) \neq \emptyset$ and $A(t, i)$ holds in p_k.

By the assumption and Lemma 4.2 $t = top$. By the induction hypothesis $A(t, i)$ holds in p''.

Moreover, $p_{k+1}(i) = \{top\}$ implies $top \in p(i)$. By the assumption and Lemma 4.2 for no $t' \neq top$ we have $p''(i) = \{t'\}$. Hence any maximal sequence of reductions from p'' will lead to a network $p^\#$, with $p^\#(i) = \{top\}$. But $p \to^* p''$ is a maximal sequence of reductions, so $p^\# = p''$ and consequently $p''(i) = \{top\}$.

We conclude by induction that for all nodes i if $p'(i) = \{t\}$, then $p''(i) = \{t\}$. By symmetry the reverse implication holds. By the definition of the $\to$ relation this implies that $p' = p''$. $\square$

Proof of Theorem 4.1
($\Rightarrow$) If $[top]$ is unavoidable, then it is reachable from p, hence, thanks to Theorem 3.2 we only need to establish the first condition. But if for some node i such that $N(i) = \emptyset$ we have $p(i) \neq \{top\}$, then i can adopt a different product than top and $[top]$ cannot be unavoidable.

($\Leftarrow$) By Theorem 3.2 $[top]$ is reachable, so we only need to show that it is a unique outcome. But this is guaranteed by Lemma 4.3. $\square$

In analogy to Theorem 3.5, we also have the following simple fact.

Theorem 4.4 *Assume a network* (G, P, p, θ) *and a product* $top \in P$. *There is an algorithm, running in time* $O(n^2)$, *that determines whether the network* $(G, P, [top], \theta)$ *is unavoidable.*

5 Unique outcomes

Finally, we consider the question of when a network admits a unique outcome. In the definition of the reduction relation $\rightarrow$ between networks we only stipulate that *some* node adopts a product. In several situations the order in which nodes adopt the products does not matter. So this definition can introduce a 'spurious' nondeterminism in the sense that all maximal reduction sequences still yield the same outcome. One way to eliminate this spurious nondeterminism consists of employing a different form of reduction, that we call below *fast*, in which we stipulate that *all* nodes that can adopt a product do so. A natural conjecture is then that a network does not admit a unique outcome iff such a modified form of reduction eventually yields a network in which a node can adopt more than one product. However, such a conjecture is false. As an example consider the network in Figure 2.


Figure 2: An example of a network with a non-unique outcome, with $P = \{t_1, t_2\}$.

In this network such a fast reduction eventually yields a network in which node c adopts product t_2. However, there is also another reduction sequence which results in node c adopting product t_1. To rectify this conjecture we introduce the following concepts.

Definition 5.1 Given networks p, p' based on the same graph we say that

- the reduction $p \rightarrow p'$ is *fast* if for each node i, if i can adopt a product in p then i adopted a product in p'. Intuitively, $p \rightarrow p'$ is then a 'maximal' one-step reduction of p,

- node i *can switch in* p' *given* p if i adopted t in p' and for some $t' \neq t$

$$t' \in p(i) \wedge \sum_{j \in N(i) | p'(j) = \{t'\}} w_{ji} \geq \theta(i, t'),$$

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- p' is **ambivalent given** p if it contains a node that either can adopt more than one product or can switch in p' given p. □

The definition of ambivalence above essentially describes the two reasons that may cause a network not to admit a unique outcome. Note now that given the network in Figure 2 after performing two fast reductions we obtain a final network in which node c can switch to t_1. So the notion of switching allowed us to find out that the initial network does not admit a unique outcome. This is the case in general. To formulate the general result we need one more notion.

Definition 5.2 By the **contraction sequence** of a network we mean the unique reduction sequence $p \rightarrow^* p'$ such that

- each of its reduction steps is fast,

- either $p \rightarrow^* p'$ is maximal or p' is the first network in the sequence $p \rightarrow^* p'$ that is ambivalent given p. □

We now formulate a characterization of networks that admit a unique outcome.

Theorem 5.3 *A network admits a unique outcome iff its contraction sequence ends in a non-ambivalent network.*

Comparing this characterization to the original false conjecture we see that it still employs the fast reduction but refers to a different 'stopping criterion' that also takes into account the possibility of switching.

Proof.

$(\Rightarrow)$ Suppose that a network p admits a unique outcome and assume by contradiction that the contraction sequence χ of p ends in an ambivalent network p'. If a node in p' can adopt two different products, then we get a contradiction. Otherwise a node i' in p' can switch from a product t to a product $t' \neq t$.

Given a reduction sequence ξ that starts in p and a node i that adopted in it a product t, but not initially (so not in p), we define a modified reduction sequence in which this node can adopt a product but did not adopt any. This is done so as to cancel all adoptions that led i' to adopt t. To this end we set $p''(j) := p(j)$ for every node j that adopted product t and every network p'' from ξ and subsequently remove from the resulting sequence the duplicate networks.

Since node i' can switch from t to t', we have $\{t, t'\} \subseteq p(i')$, so on χ node i' did not adopt the product t initially. So the corresponding modification of χ w.r.t. node i' results in a reduction sequence that starts in p and in which node i' can adopt product t'. So p admits two outcomes which yields a contradiction.

($\Leftarrow$) First, given a maximal reduction sequence $\xi := p \to^* p'$ we define its *fast run* inductively by its length as follows. If $p = p'$, then p is the fast run of $p \to^* p'$. Otherwise, $\xi = p \to p_1 \to^* p'$ for some network p_1. Define a social network p_2 as follows:

$$p_2(i) := \begin{cases} \{t\} & \text{if } i \text{ can adopt } t \text{ in } p \text{ and } p'(i) = \{t\} \\ p(i) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

We have then $p \to p_2$ and $p_2 \to^* p'$. We define then the fast run of $p \to^* p'$ as the concatenation of $p \to p_2$ and the fast run of $p_2 \to^* p'$.

Intuitively, a fast run of a maximal reduction sequence $p \to^* p'$ yields the same final result, p', but by maximizing at each reduction step the number of nodes that adopt a product.

Suppose now that the contraction sequence of a network p ends in a non-ambivalent network and assume by contradiction that p admits two outcomes. So two sequences of reductions ξ and ξ' exist that both start in p, are maximal, and their final elements differ.

Let $fr(\xi)$ and $fr(\xi')$ be the respective fast runs of ξ and ξ'. By assumption at least one of these two fast runs, say $fr(\xi)$, differs from the contraction sequence χ of p. Let p'_1 be the first network in the sequence χ in which a difference with $fr(\xi)$ arises.

By assumption p'_1 is non-ambivalent, so some fast reduction $p'_1 \to p'$ is part of χ and a reduction $p'_1 \to p''$ with $p' \neq p''$ is part of $fr(\xi)$. Since $p'_1 \to p'$ is a fast reduction and $fr(\xi)$ is a fast run, the difference between p' and p'' arises due to the fact that some node i adopted in p' one product and in p'' a different product. But this means that p'_1 is ambivalent, which is a contradiction. $\square$

Theorem 5.3 yields a simple algorithm for testing whether a network has a unique outcome.

Theorem 5.4 *There exists a polynomial time algorithm, running in time $O(n^2 + n|P|)$, that determines whether a network admits a unique outcome.*

For all practical purposes we have $|P| \ll n$, so the running time is in practice $O(n^2)$.

Proof of Theorem 5.4. By Theorem 5.3 it suffices to determine whether the contraction sequence of a network p ends in a non-ambivalent social network. This can be tested using the algorithm presented in Figure 3. The algorithm keeps performing fast reductions until we realize that either a node can adopt two different products or can switch from one product to another. If none of these happens then we can safely conclude given Theorem 5.3 that the network has a unique outcome.

Given a network (G, P, p, θ), the algorithm uses for each node j and each product $t \in p(j)$ a counter $S_{j,t}$. The counter measures the accumulated weight from incoming edges that have already adopted a product t.

Regarding the complexity of the algorithm, the initial part of producing the required representation in Line 1 may take time up to $O(n^2)$ if we are given the matrix representation or any other of the standard ways of representing a graph. The initialization of the counters $S_{j,t}$ requires in the worst case $O(n|P|)$. As for the remaining part, the variable L maintains the set of nodes that adopted a product in the last round (Lines 11 and 28). Each edge (i, j) is examined exactly once, just after i adopts a product.

The number of operations that we need to perform for every edge is $O(1)$ because we only need to update the appropriate counter $S_{j,t}$ and add j to the list R (Lines 16-17). Furthermore, we also need to check for each such j whether it can adopt more than one product. This can also be done while we update each counter $S_{j,t}$ by having another counter that increases by one for every $S_{j,t}$ that exceeds the threshold $\theta(j, t)$. In total, we do not need more than $O(1)$ operations per edge and therefore the total running time is $O(n^2 + n|P| + |E|) = O(n^2 + n|P|)$. □

It would be interesting to find a structural characterization of networks that admit a unique outcome, as Theorem 5.3 only provides such a characterization in terms of the contraction sequences. At this stage we only have the following result.

Corollary 5.5 *Assume a network (G, P, p, θ) such that for all nodes i and products t we have $\theta(i, t) > \frac{1}{2}$,*

Then (G, P, p, θ) admits a unique outcome iff for all i, $N(i) = \emptyset$ implies that $p(i)$ is a singleton.

Proof. The $(\Rightarrow)$ implication is obvious. For the $(\Leftarrow)$ implication it suffices to note that if $p \rightarrow^* p'$, then p' is not ambivalent given p. So the result is a direct consequence of Theorem 5.3. □

This corollary can be strengthened by assuming that the network is such that if for some product t we have $\theta(i, t) \leq \frac{1}{2}$, then $|N(i)| < 2$ or $|p(i)| = 1$. The reason is that the nodes for which $|N(i)| < 2$ or $|p(i)| = 1$ cannot introduce an ambivalence.

When for some node i and product t, $\theta(i, t) \leq \frac{1}{2}$ holds and neither $|N(i)| < 2$ nor $|p(i)| = 1$, the equitable network still may admit a unique outcome but it does not have to. For instance the second network in Figure 1 admits a unique outcome for the last three alternatives (explained in Example 2.3), while for the first two it does not.

Finally, we note that for the class of networks of Corollary 5.5 we have a simpler algorithm, removing the dependency on $|P|$.

1: Produce the representation with a list of outgoing edges for each node;
2: **for** $i \in V$ **do**
3:     Set $p(i)$ to be the initial list of products available to node i;
4: **end for**
5: **for** $j \in V, t \in p(j)$ **do**
6:     $S_{j,t} := 0$; // counts total weight to j from nodes that adopted t
7: **end for**
8: **if** $\exists i \in V$ with $N(i) = \emptyset$ and $|p(i)| \geq 2$ **then**
9:     **return** "No unique outcome";
10: **end if**
11: $L := \{i \in V : |p(i)| = 1\}$; // initialize L to a list of nodes that already have adopted a product
12: **if** $L = \emptyset$ **return** "Unique outcome"; **endif**
13: **while** $L \neq \emptyset$ **do**
14:     $R := \emptyset$;
15:     **for** $i \in L$ and j such that $(i,j) \in E$ **do**
16:         **if** i has adopted t and $t \in p(j)$ **then** $S_{j,t} := S_{j,t} + w_{ij}$; **end if**
17:         $R := R \cup \{j\}$; // nodes we need to check for ambivalence
18:     **end for**
19:     **for** $j \in R$ **do**
20:         Compute $|\{t : S_{j,t} \geq \theta(j,t)\}|$; // even for nodes that have already adopted a product
21:         **if** $|\{t : S_{j,t} \geq \theta(j,t)\}| \geq 2$ **return** "No unique outcome"; **endif**
22:         **if** $|\{t : S_{j,t} \geq \theta(j,t)\}| = 1$ and j has not yet adopted t **then**
23:             node j adopts product t;
24:         **else**
25:             $R := R \setminus \{j\}$; // node j does not adopt any product
26:         **end if**
27:     **end for**
28:     $L := R$; // put in L all nodes that adopted a product in last round
29: **end while**
30: **return** "Unique outcome" // No further reduction is possible

Figure 3: Pseudocode for the algorithm of Theorem 5.4

Theorem 5.6 *There exists an algorithm, running in time $O(n^2)$, that determines whether a network, such that for all nodes i and products t we have $\theta(i,t) > \frac{1}{2}$, admits a unique outcome.*

Proof. By Corollary 5.5. □

6 Product adoption

In this section we study a number of questions concerning adoption of the products by the nodes of a given network, focusing on complexity matters. Recall that given an initial network p, a final network is one that has been obtained from p by a maximal sequence of reductions. We first clarify the complexity of the following problem.

FINAL: Given an initial network determine whether a final network exists in which every node adopted some product.

Note that in the definition of the problem, we do not insist that all nodes adopt the same product, but only that every node has eventually chosen a product.

Theorem 6.1 *FINAL is NP-complete, even for 2 products and product independent thresholds.*

Proof. First we prove that **FINAL** is in NP. Given an initial network, the certificate can consist of a final network in which every node adopted some product along with the series of reductions that led to this final network (there can be at most $O(n)$ such reductions). One can then check in polynomial time that this is a valid final network, given the initial network, and that indeed all nodes have adopted a product.

For NP-hardness, we give a reduction from the NP-complete PARTITION problem, which is: given n positive rational numbers $(a_1,\ldots,a_n)$, is there a set S such that $\sum_{i\in S} a_i = \sum_{i\notin S} a_i$? Consider an instance I of PARTITION. Without loss of generality, suppose we have normalized the numbers so that $\sum_{i=1}^n a_i = \frac{1}{2}$. Hence the question is to decide whether there is a set S such that $\sum_{i\in S} a_i = \sum_{i\notin S} a_i = \frac{1}{4}$.

We build an instance of our problem with two products, namely $P = \{t_1, t_2\}$, and with the network shown in Figure 4. The threshold function does not depend on the product argument (that is omitted) and is given by: $\theta(a) = \theta(b) = \frac{3}{4}$. Finally, for each node $i \in \{1,\ldots,n\}$, we set $w_{ia} = w_{ib} = a_i$. The weights of the other two edges are $\frac{1}{2}$.

Suppose there is a solution S to I. Then we can have the nodes corresponding to the set S adopt t_1 and the remaining nodes from $\{1,\ldots,n\}$ adopt t_2. By the choice

Figure 4: Social network related to the **FINAL** problem, with $P = \{t_1, t_2\}$.

of the weights w_{ia} and w_{ib} this implies that node a can adopt t_1 and node b can adopt t_2. Hence a final network exists in which all nodes adopted a product.

For the reverse direction, suppose that a final network exists in which all nodes adopted a product. Then node a adopted product t_1 and node b adopted product t_2, as it is not possible for node a to adopt t_2 and for node b to adopt t_1. Let S be the set of nodes $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$ that adopted product t_1. Then by the choice of the weights w_{ia} and w_{ib} and the thresholds of the nodes a and b, it holds that both $\sum_{i \in S} a_i \geq \frac{1}{4}$ and $\sum_{i \notin S} a_i \geq \frac{1}{4}$. But since $\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i = \frac{1}{2}$, this implies that $\sum_{i \in S} a_i = \sum_{i \notin S} a_i = \frac{1}{4}$, i.e., there is a solution to the instance I of the PARTITION problem. $\square$

We now move on to a different class of problems, motivated by the results of Section 5, which reveal that many networks will not admit a unique outcome. Therefore the following questions concerning product adoption by a given node are of natural interest for such networks.

ADOPTION 1: (unavoidable adoption of some product)
Determine whether a given node has to adopt some product in all final networks.
ADOPTION 2: (unavoidable adoption of a given product)
Determine whether a given node has to adopt a given product in all final networks.
ADOPTION 3: (possible adoption of some product)
Determine whether a given node adopted some product in some final network.
ADOPTION 4: (possible adoption of a given product)
Determine whether a given node adopted a given product in some final network.
Below we resolve the complexity of all these problems.

Theorem 6.2 *The complexity of the above problems is as follows:*

(i) **ADOPTION 1** *is co-NP-complete, even for 2 products and product independent thresholds.*

(ii) **ADOPTION 2** *for 2 products can be solved in $O(n^2)$ time.*

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(iii) **ADOPTION 2** *is co-NP-complete for at least* 3 *products, even with product independent thresholds.*

(iv) **ADOPTION 3** *can be solved in* $O(n^2|P|)$ *time.*

(v) **ADOPTION 4** *can be solved in* $O(n^2)$ *time.*

Proof.

(i) It suffices to prove NP-completeness of the complementary problem, which is: given an initial network determine if there is a final network in which a given node does not adopt any product. The argument for the membership in NP is very similar to the membership proof in Theorem 6.1.

To prove NP-hardness, we use again a reduction from the PARTITION problem but with a different normalization for the PARTITION instance. In particular, we assume an instance I with the numbers $a_1, ..., a_n$ satisfying $\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i = 1$. Hence the question is to decide whether there is a set S such that $\sum_{i \in S} a_i = \sum_{i \notin S} a_i = \frac{1}{2}$. We also use a slightly different network than the one depicted in Figure 4. Given the instance I we use the network presented in Figure 5. This network depicts an instance of our problem with $P = \{t_1, t_2\}$ and with node c as the "designated" node. The threshold function does not depend on the product argument (that is omitted) and is given by: $\theta(a) = \theta(b) = \frac{1}{2}$, and $\theta(c) = 1$. Finally, as in the proof of Theorem 6.1, for each node $i \in \{1, ..., n\}$, we set $w_{ia} = w_{ib} = a_i$. We also use the weights $w_{ac} = w_{bc} = \frac{1}{2}$.


Figure 5: Social network related to the **ADOPTION 1** problem. Here $P = \{t_1, t_2\}$.

Suppose now that there is a solution S to the PARTITION instance. Then we can have the nodes corresponding to the set S adopt t_1 and the remaining nodes from $\{1, ..., n\}$ adopt t_2. By the choice of the weights w_{ia} and w_{ib} and the thresholds of

a and b, this implies that node a can adopt t_1 and node b can adopt t_2. In that case node c cannot adopt any product. Thus a final network exists in which node c does not adopt any product.

Suppose now that in a final network node c did not adopt any product. Then it cannot be the case that nodes a and b adopted the same product since then node c would have adopted it as well. Note also that in all final networks nodes a and b have adopted some product. Suppose without loss of generality that node a adopted t_1 and node b adopted t_2. Let S be the set of nodes $i \in \{1,\ldots,n\}$ that adopted t_1. Then the nodes $i \in \{1,\ldots,n\} \setminus S$ adopted t_2. By the choice of the weights we have both $\sum_{i \in S} a_i \geq \frac{1}{2}$ and $\sum_{i \notin S} a_i \geq \frac{1}{2}$. But since $\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i = 1$, this implies that $\sum_{i \in S} a_i = \sum_{i \notin S} a_i = \frac{1}{2}$, i.e., there is a solution to the instance I of the PARTITION problem.

(ii) The algorithm resembles the one used in the proof of Theorem 5.4. Let $P = \{t_1, t_2\}$, and suppose the given product is t_1. We use the following observation. To determine whether a given node has to adopt t_1 in all final networks, it suffices to check this for the worst possible final network with respect to adoption of t_1. So we first perform fast reductions only for product t_2. Once no further adoption of t_2 is possible, we perform all possible adoptions of t_1 so as to reach a final network. If in this final network, the given node has not adopted t_1, the answer to **ADOPTION 2** is No and otherwise the answer is Yes.

(iii) We provide a reduction from PARTITION but with a slightly more involved network than in the proof of (i). Note that again, it suffices to prove NP-completeness of the complementary problem, which is: given an initial network determine if there is a final network in which a given node does not adopt the given product. The argument for the membership in NP is straighforward.

To prove NP-hardness, we start again with a PARTITION instance I with the numbers $a_1, \ldots, a_n$ satisfying $\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i = 1$. From this we construct the network shown in Figure 6. This network has 3 products, $P = \{t_1, t_2, t_3\}$, the designated node is e and the designated product is t_3. The weights in the first layer of the graph are as in (i). The rest of the weights are shown in the figure. The product independent threshold function is given by $\theta(a) = \theta(b) = \theta(c) = \theta(d) = \frac{1}{2}$, $\theta(e) = 1/2 + \varepsilon$, for some $\varepsilon > 0$.

Suppose there is a solution S to I. Then we can have the nodes corresponding to the set S adopt t_1 and the remaining nodes from $\{1,\ldots,n\}$ adopt t_2. Then node a can adopt t_1 and node b can adopt t_2. Subsequently, node c can adopt t_1 and node d can adopt t_2. This yields a final network in which node e does not adopt product t_3.

Conversely, suppose that in a final network node e did not adopt product t_3.

Figure 6: Social network related to the **ADOPTION 2** problem. We fix $R = \{t_1, t_2\}$.

Then neither node c nor node d adopted t_3. Hence node c adopted t_1 and node d adopted t_2 and consequently node a adopted t_1 and node b adopted t_2. As in the proof of part (i) this implies that there is a solution to the instance I of the PARTITION problem.

(v) The algorithm resembles the one used in the proof of Theorem 5.4. Given a product, say t, it suffices to start with the nodes that have already adopted t, perform fast reductions but only with respect to t until no further adoption of t is possible, and check if the given node has adopted t.

(iv) Run the algorithm used in (v) for each product. $\qquad\square$

It is interesting to observe the separation between **ADOPTION 1** and **ADOPTION 2** for $|P| = 2$. While for $|P| \geq 3$ both problems are co-NP-complete and the proofs are based on similar arguments, in the case that $|P| = 2$, **ADOPTION 2** becomes efficiently solvable but **ADOPTION 1** remains co-NP-complete.

We conclude our study by the following two optimization problems. Suppose that a given product top is neither reachable by all nodes nor unavoidable for all nodes. We would like then to estimate what is the worst and best-case scenario for the spread of this product. That is, starting from a given initial network p, what is the minimum (resp. maximum) number of nodes that will adopt this product in a final network. Hence, the following two problems are of interest.

MIN-ADOPTION: Given an initial network and a product top, what is the minimum number of nodes that adopted top in a final network.

MAX-ADOPTION: Given an initial network and a product top, what is the max-

imum number of nodes that adopted *top* in a final network.

We show that these two problems are substantially different, the first being essentially inapproximable, while the second being efficiently solvable.

Theorem 6.3 *Suppose n is the number of nodes of a network.*

(i) **MAX-ADOPTION** *can be solved in $O(n^2)$ time.*

(ii) **MIN-ADOPTION** *for 2 products can be solved in $O(n^2)$ time.*

(iii) *For at least 3 products and even with product independent thresholds, it is NP-hard to approximate **MIN-ADOPTION** with an approximation ratio better than $\Omega(n)$.*

Proof.
(i) The algorithm is analogous to the one used when analyzing the **ADOPTION 4** problem in the proof of Theorem 6.2. Given a product t, we start with the nodes that have already adopted the product and perform fast reductions but only with respect to t until no further adoption of t is possible.

(ii) Suppose $P = \{t_1, t_2\}$ and that t_1 is the designated product. We first solve the **MAX-ADOPTION** problem for product t_2 and then perform any necessary adoptions of t_1 to reach a final network. This yields a final network with the minimum number of adoptions for product t_1, since we only perform adoptions of t_1 that are necessary to reach a final network after first flooding the network as much as possible with the competitor. Note that this cannot be extended to the case of more products because then the order in which the competitors of t_1 spread may play a crucial role for minimizing the adoptions of product t_1. Hence it is not easy to determine a priori the sequence of adoptions of the products competing t_1.

(iii) We again give a reduction from PARTITION, though the appropriate network is now more involved. Consider an instance I of PARTITION problem, so n positive rational numbers $(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ such that $\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i = 1$. We build an instance of our problem with 3 products, namely $P = \{t_1, t_2, t_3\}$, and with the network shown in Figure 7. Note that this is derived by adding to the network of Figure 6 a chain of M nodes starting from node e. We take M to be $n^{O(1)}$ so that the reduction is of polynomial time. The weight of each edge in the chain is set to 1.

We consider t_3 as the designated product. The threshold function does not depend on the product argument (that is omitted) and is given by: $\theta(a) = \theta(b) = \theta(c) = \theta(d) = \frac{1}{2}$, $\theta(e) = 1/2 + \varepsilon$, for some $\varepsilon > 0$ and for the nodes to the right of node e we can set the thresholds to an arbitrary positive number in $(0, 1]$. Finally, for each node $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$, we set $w_{ia} = w_{ib} = a_i$. The weights of the other edges can be seen in the figure.

Figure 7: The graph of the reduction with $P = \{t_1, t_2, t_3\}$ and $R = \{t_1, t_2\}$.

We claim that if there exists a solution to the instance I, then a final network exists with the number of nodes that adopted t_3 equal to 3, and otherwise in all final networks the number of nodes that adopted t_3 equals $M + 5$. This claim directly yields the desired result, since $M = \Omega(|V|)$.

Suppose there is a solution S to I. As in the proof of Theorem 6.2(iii) it follows that there exists a final network in which node e did not adopt product t_3. Hence a final network exists in which only 3 nodes adopted t_3.

For the reverse direction, suppose there is no solution to the PARTITION problem. This means that no matter how we partition the nodes $\{1, \ldots, n\}$, into two sets S, S', it will always be that for one of them, say S, we have $\sum_{i \in S} a_i > \frac{1}{2}$, whereas for the other we have $\sum_{i \in S'} a_i < \frac{1}{2}$. Thus in each final network, no matter which nodes from $\{1, \ldots, n\}$ adopted t_1 or t_2, the nodes a and b adopted the same product. Suppose for example that nodes a and b both adopted t_1 (the same reasoning applies if they both adopted t_2). This in turn implies that node c adopted t_1 and node d did not adopt t_2. Thus, the only possibility for node d is to adopt t_3. But then the only choice for node e is to adopt t_3 and this propagates along the chain starting from node e. This completes the proof. □

7 Structural results

In [2] we used a slightly more restricted model of a social network in that the threshold functions were product independent. We clarify here the relation between these two models by presenting two transformations of the social networks

considered here, to social networks with product independent threshold functions and by explaining in which sense they are related.

The first transformation takes as input an arbitrary social network $\mathscr{S} := (G, P, p, \theta)$ and produces an equitable social network with threshold functions that do not depend on the product argument.

First we add a new product t_0 to P. Then for each node i such that $N(i) \neq \emptyset$ and $|p(i)| \geq 2$ we remove the edges $j \to i$ for each node $j \in N(i)$ and perform the following steps for each product $t \in p(i)$ and each minimal subset S of $N(i)$ such that $\sum_{j \in S | p(j) = \{t\}} w_{ji} \geq \theta(i, t)$:

- add a new node $a_{S,t,i}$,

- put $p(a_{S,t,i}) := \{t, t_0\}$ and $\theta(a_{S,t,i}) := 1$,

- add the edges $j \to a_{S,t,i}$ for each node $j \in S$,

- add the edge $a_{S,t,i} \to i$,

- put $\theta(i) := \frac{1}{2^{|N(i)|}|p(i)|}$.

Call the resulting equitable network $\mathscr{S}'$. Intuitively, in this new network, a node i can adopt a product t when t is adopted by any one of the nodes $a_{S,t,i}$, described above, which represent minimal subsets that can cause adoption. The new product independent threshold of node i is set in a way that any such set S can make node i adopt a product. Finally, we also need to add the product t_0 to $p(a_{S,t,i})$ so that this node does not automatically adopt t.

The following result relates the networks $\mathscr{S}$ and $\mathscr{S}'$. We say here that p_0' is an ***extension*** of a network p_0 if it can be obtained from p_0 by repeatedly replacing an edge $j \to i$ by a set of edges $\{j \to k, k \to i \mid k \in S_{i,j}\}$, where $S_{i,j}$ is a set of new nodes, each with an appropriate set of products and a threshold function. p_0' is then interpreted as an equitable network. We also say then that p_0 is a ***restriction*** of p_0'.

Theorem 7.1 *Consider the networks $\mathscr{S}$ and $\mathscr{S}'$.*

(i) *If $\mathscr{S} \to^* p_0$ for a final network p_0 given $\mathscr{S}$, then for an extension p_0' of p_0 we have $\mathscr{S}' \to^* p_0'$, where p_0' is a final network given $\mathscr{S}'$.*

(ii) *If $\mathscr{S}' \to^* p_0'$ for a final network p_0' given $\mathscr{S}'$, then for a restriction p_0 of p_0' we have $\mathscr{S} \to^* p_0$, where p_0 is a final network given $\mathscr{S}$.*

Proof.
(i) Let i be the first node belonging to $\mathscr{S}$ and such that $N(i) \neq \emptyset$, $|p(i)| \geq 2$ and i adopted a product t in the reduction sequence $\mathscr{S} \to^* p_0$. So for some subset S

of $N(i)$ we have $\sum_{j \in S | p(j) = \{t\}} w_{ji} \geq \theta(i,t)$. Choose a minimal subset S with this property. Then by the definition of the threshold functions in the network $\mathscr{S}'$ node $a_{S,t,i}$ can adopt product t and subsequently node i can adopt t, as well. Repeating this procedure we obtain the desired extension p_0' of p_0.

(ii) Let i be the first node belonging to $\mathscr{S}$ such that $N(i) \neq \emptyset$, $|p(i)| \geq 2$ and i adopted a product t in the reduction sequence $\mathscr{S}' \to^* p_0'$. So product t was first adopted in $\mathscr{S}'$ by some node $a_{S,t,i}$ and then by i. By the definition of the thresholds functions in $\mathscr{S}'$ node i can adopt product t in the network $\mathscr{S}$. Repeating this procedure we obtain the desired restriction p_0 of p_0'. $\qquad\square$

A disadvantage of this transformation is that it yields an exponential blow up in the number of nodes. Indeed, $\mathscr{S}'$ has in the worst case $n + n2^n |P|$ nodes, where n is the number of nodes in $\mathscr{S}$.

A smaller increase can be achieved by the second transformation that takes as input an equitable network $\mathscr{S} := (G, P, p, \theta)$. First we add a new product t_0 to P. Then for each node i such that $N(i) \neq \emptyset$ and $|p(i)| \geq 2$ we remove the edges $j \to i$ for each node $j \in N(i)$ and perform the following steps for each product $t \in p(i)$:

- add a new node $a_{t,i}$,

- put $p(a_{t,i}) := \{t, t_0\}$ and $\theta(a_{t,i}) := \theta(i,t)$,

- add the edges $j \to a_{t,i}$ for each node $j \in N(i)$,

- add the edge $a_{t,i} \to i$,

- put $\theta(i) := \frac{1}{|p(i)|}$.

Call the resulting network $\mathscr{S}'$. Note that $\mathscr{S}'$ has $\leq n(|P|+1)$ nodes, where n is the number of nodes in $\mathscr{S}$. The intuition behind this construction is simply that, unlike the first transformation, we do not need to argue separately about each minimal subset that can cause further adoptions. The following result relates the networks $\mathscr{S}$ and $\mathscr{S}'$.

Theorem 7.2 *Consider the equitable networks $\mathscr{S}$ and $\mathscr{S}'$.*

(i) *If $\mathscr{S} \to^* p_0$ for a final network p_0 given $\mathscr{S}$, then for some extension p_0' of p_0 we have $\mathscr{S}' \to^* p_0'$, where p_0' is a final network given $\mathscr{S}'$.*

(ii) *If $\mathscr{S}' \to^* p_0'$ for a final network p_0' given $\mathscr{S}'$, then for a restriction p_0 of p_0' we have $\mathscr{S} \to^* p_0$, where p_0 is a final network given $\mathscr{S}$.*

Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 7.1 and omitted. $\qquad\square$

8 Conclusions and future work

We have introduced a diffusion model in the presence of multiple competing products and studied some basic questions. We have provided characterizations of the underlying graph structure for determining whether a product can spread or will necessarily spread to the whole network, and of the networks that admit a unique outcome. We also studied the complexity of various problems that are of interest for networks that do not admit a unique outcome, such as the problems of computing the minimum or maximum number of nodes that will adopt a given product in a final network, or the problem of determining whether a given node has to adopt some (resp. a given) product in all final networks.

Our model of a social network attempts to capture a realistic situation in which customers can select out of a number of products and are influenced in their selection by their acquaintances and friends. Having this in mind it is useful to reflect on some of our results from the viewpoint of a company trying to sell a specific product. First, Theorem 6.3(*iii*) shows that the precise assessment of the worst case scenario is computationally difficult. In contrast, the computation of the best case scenario (item (*i*)) is easy. Next, Theorems 3.5 and 4.4 show that it is computationally easy to check whether an adoption of a single product is possible or unavoidable.

However, one should bear in mind that 'computationally easy' refers to the time complexity $O(n^2)$ that can be too high for huge networks. Still such an analysis may be useful for specialized networks, for instance those concerning choice of a supermarket or a primary school in a neighbourhood.

We conclude by listing some further topics of recent and future work.

Game theoretic analysis A natural follow up to this work is a game theoretic analysis that aims at predicting customer behaviour. Such an analysis for players choosing between two products has been presented in [21]. An extension with the additional option of adopting both products has also been considered in [16] (e.g. choosing to have two operating systems in your PC, instead of just one).

Recently [24], and more fully [25], used the model introduced here to study consequences of adopting products by the nodes forming a social network. This led to a study of strategic games in which the nodes decide which product to choose (or decide not to adopt any). In particular, deciding whether a game in this class has a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-complete, while deciding whether a game has the so-called finite improvement property is co-NP-hard.

Other game-theoretic approaches can also be considered based on our model. In particular, one can consider a strategic game between the producers who decide to offer their products for free to some selected nodes. A limited case was studied

in [1] (see also [26]) in a simpler model in which the thresholds were all equal to $1/|N(v)|$ for every node v (i.e., one neighbor suffices to infect you). Some recent follow up works on richer models include [14] and [27]. An interesting direction here is to obtain a better understanding of the structure of Nash equilibria (pure or mixed), or identify conditions that guarantee the existence of pure equilibria.

Introducing new products When a new product is introduced in a market, it is natural to assume that this takes place when various customers have already adopted some other product. The issue is then whether some nodes would switch to the new product. The present model does not allow us to study such a problem since the input network for such an analysis is already a final network and we stipulate that the choices of the nodes are final. Allowing a switching by a node to a new product can result in an 'illegal' network, in which choices of some nodes are not anymore justified and have to be reconsidered.

In contrast, in the framework of [24] and [25] such a study is possible, since the input is simply a strategy profile that is an assignment of products to nodes (with a special 'no-choice' strategy allowed). Recently we studied in this setting, in [3], the consequences of introducing new products by means of improvement paths in the sense of [20], the special case of which is the best-response dynamics.

Analysis for specific networks Regarding the results of Section 6, it would be interesting to see if the negative results can be alleviated by studying special cases of networks. One example is to find classes of graphs for which we can have efficient constant factor approximation algorithms for the MIN-ADOPTION problem. We are also not yet aware if the same hardness results hold for equitable networks. Finally, it would be interesting to study such problems for graphs that resemble real networks with respect to degree distribution or other graph theoretic properties.

Optimizing the spread of a product Given a diffusion model, one important problem, especially in the context of viral marketing is: given a network (G, P, p, θ), a product $t \in P$, and $k \geq 0$, we wish to find the optimal set S of nodes, under the restrictions that $|S| \leq k$ and $t \in p(i)$ for $i \in S$, such that if we give the product t to the members of S, optimal spread is achieved.

The parameter k indicates a bound on the budget for the company's advertising campaign. This problem was initially studied for the case of a single product, and when the thresholds are random variables in [18] (as noted in [18], when thresholds are fixed numbers strong inapproximability results hold). For the threshold model, some extensions to the case of two products appeared in [5], where various options on how nodes decide when choosing between two products have been proposed.

The algorithmic challenge here is to compute the optimal set given that the opponents have already chosen their seed sets. In most cases, the techniques of [18] cannot be applied and algorithmic results are still elusive. It would be interesting to make further progress on this for multiple products.

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